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BATTERY
Physician's Performance of Hysterectomy Not Medical
Battery When No Alternatives Available
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana held a physician who performed a
hysterectomy rather than a myomectomy did not commit medical battery
because no other alternatives were available.'
In 1966, the patient underwent a myomectomy to remove a fibroid
tumor.2 The tumor returned in 1972, and in 19S3, the patient inquired
about having defendant physician remove the tumor via laser surgery.3
The patient specifically informed defendant physician she did not want a
hysterectomy. 4 At the time of this consultation, defendant physician
believed he could remove the tumor without removing her reproductive
organs.' The patient consented to the laser surgery only after being
promised a hysterectomy would not be performed.6 In fact, the patient
specifically instructed her brother not to give consent for any other
operation unless the patienVs death was imminent.7
During the patient's surgery, defendant physician discovered the
tumor weighed fifteen pounds and was consuming one-half of her body's
blood supply! Defendant physician conveyed this information to the
patient's brother via audio and video connection.9 Although her brother
never actually consented to the hysterectomy, he did not protest when
defendant physician opted to remove the patient's uterus."° The patient
subsequently filed suit against defendant physician for medical battery
based on the performance of a hysterectomy without the patient's
consent.1'
Defendant physician testified the size of the tumor was unforeseen,
and rendered a life-threatening situation.' As a result, the court found no
other alternative existed under the circumstances, and held the procedure
'Niklaus v. Bellina, 696 So.2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
2 d. at 124.
3id.
41d.
'Id.
6Niklaus v. Bellina, 696 So.2d 120, 124 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
7id.
81d.
91d. at 125.
101d.
"Niklaus v. Bellina, 696 So.2d 120, 121 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
1id. at 127.
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did not constitute a medical battery. 3 Niklaus v. Bellina, 696 So.2d 120
(La. Ct. App. 1997).
DISABILITY
Supervisors Did Not Meet Statutory Requirement
of "Employer" Under the ADA
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
plaintiff could not sue the individual defendant supervisors under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) because the supervisors
did not meet the statutory definition of an "employer."' 4 Nevertheless,
plaintiff could bring an action against defendant employer, the Department
of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse (Department). However, the court
held the plaintiffs claims against the Department were barred by the
statute of limitations, although the court upheld plaintiff s claim for
adverse employment action. 5
Plaintiff, a former employee of the Department, tested positive for
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).16 On two separate occasions,
plaintiff requested to be allowed to work at home because he was
suffering from AIDS-related illnesses. 17 Defendant supervisors denied his
request, and plaintiff received a negative performance evaluation.'8 A few
months later, plaintiff received another negative performance evaluation,
and was subsequently discharged for falsifying his arrival and departure
times. 9 Plaintiff brought a claim against defendant supervisors and the
Department under the ADA, as well as a retaliation claim.2" Defendants
responded by filing a motion to dismiss.'
"Id. at 128.
"
4Cebuhar v. Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse, No. 96 C 7363, 1997
VL 222871, at *3 (N.D. II. Apr. 24, 1997).
'S1d. at *4-7.
'
6Id. at *1.
17Id.
"Id. at *2.
"Cebuhar v. Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse, No. 96 C 7363, 1997
WL 222871, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1997).
2°Id.
2tId. at *3.
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The court held the claim against the individual defendant supervisors
should be dismissed because they were not "employers" under the ADA.22
The court also dismissed three counts barred by the two-year statute of
limitations, running from the date of plaintiffs discharge.'
Finally, the court held plaintiff could maintain an action against
defendants for retaliation, which was strictly prohibited by the ADA. 4 In
order to state aprimafacie case of retaliation under the ADA, plaintiff
was required to allege:
(1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression,
(2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and
(3) a causal link betveen the protected expression and the adverse
action.
The court held that a false negative evaluation and a discharge were
adverse employment actions.26 As a result, plaintiff could state a claim for
retaliation under the ADA and defendants' motion to dismiss was
denied. Cebuhar v. Department ofAlcoholism and Substance Abuse, No.
96 C 7363, 1997 WL 222871 (.D. fl. Apr. 24, 1997).
Employee Diagnosed with Osteoarthritis Failed to
Qualify for Protection Under Rehabilitation Act
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, denied plaintiffs motion to strike summary judgment
evidence because the reports presented by defendant were authentic and
not hearsay. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted
because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case showing she
2Id.
23Id. at *4.
24Cebuhar v. Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse, No. 96 C 7363, 1997 WL
222871, at *6 (N.D. III. Apr. 24, 1997).
"'Id. at *6-7 (citing Roth v. Lutheran General Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir.
1995)).
2Id. at *7.
27Id.
1997]
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qualified for protection under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.28
Plaintiff was working for defendant hospital as a housekeeper when
she slipped and fell while leaving work.29 Plaintiff was diagnosed with a
sprained knee, but was told she could continue working at the hospital.3"
Seventeen months later, plaintiff was diagnosed with osteoarthritis, a
conditiofi involving loss of knee cartilage that caused pain and
deformity.3' Because plaintiff was considered to be too young and obese
for a knee replacement, she was treated with cortisone shots and pain
medication.3
Fourteen months after being diagnosed and treated for osteoarthritis,
plaintiff slipped and fell again, and was again diagnosed with a sprainedknee. 33 Upon retuming to work six days later, her physician
recommended that she perform only light duty work, although she
continued to perform her job as she always had in the past.3 4 During that
same time period, plaintiff received various memoranda outlining the
deficiency of her work.3 1 She was placed on probation numerous times, 36
and was eventually fired for her poor work performance in March, 1995.31
The court found the employee evaluations were not hearsay, and the
various documents concerning plaintiff's job performance were authentic
and relevant.38 The court concluded plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case for disability discrimination.39 Specifically, plaintiff failed to
show the following:
(1) she was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act,
(2) she was "otherwise qualified" for the housekeeping position, and
"Pritchard v. MacNeal Hosp., 960 F. Supp. 1321, 1321 (N.D. II1. 1997) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 794).291d.
301d.
3 id.
32Id. at 1322.33Pritchard v. MacNeal Hosp., 960 F. Supp. 1321, 1322 (N.D. 111. 1997).
3'4Id.351d.
36Id.
"Id. at 1323.
3"Pritchard v. MacNeal Hosp., 960 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (N.D. Il. 1997).
391d. at 1325.
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(3) she suffered an adverse employment decision based solely upon her
disability.
Therefore, plaintiff failed to refute defendant's legitimate reason for firing
her.40 Pritchard v. MacNeal Hosp., 960 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. 171. 1997).
Injured Ankle Insufficient to Support Disability Claim
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, held plaintiffs
ankle injury was permanent, qualifying him for accidental disability
retirement benefits.41
The plaintiff, a police officer, suffered a serious ankle injury as a
result of being shot while on duty.42 The injury involved swelling and
stiffness, which restricted the movement of his ankle.43 Although his
claim was rejected by the hearing officer and affirmed by the Comptroller,
defendant applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. 44 On
appeal, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the
permanence of the plaintiff's injury. 4 The court considered the testimony
of the plaintiff's superior officer and his partner concerning the substantial
limitation of the plaintiffs movement and strength of his ankle.46
Additionally, defendant's expert agreed with the plaintiffs expert in
finding permanent disability.47 Hence, the court reversed the Comp-
troller's decision and remanded the case.4S Morrisey v. New York State,
656 N. YS.2d 567 (N. YApp. Div. 1977).
401d. at 1327.
41Morrisey v. New York State, 656 N.Y.S.2d 567, 56S (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).421d.
431d.
44Id.
411d. at 569.
4"Morrisey v. New York State, 656 N.Y.S.2d 567, 56S (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
"7Id.
4 1d. at 569.
1997] 915
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ADA Permitted Individuals to Settle or Waive
Claims by Express, Voluntary Agreement
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant by holding
plaintiff voluntarily waived his claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).49
Plaintiff's lower leg consisted of a prosthetic device.50 Plaintiff sued
his employer and its insurer two years after his termination of employment
under the ADA and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), alleging his former waiver and release were hivalid.5' The
court found plaintiff did not present evidence that created a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether his waiver and release were made
voluntarily and knowingly.1
2
The court applied the totality of circumstances approach and noted
plaintiff did not provide an affidavit or physician's testimony
demonstrating plaintiff could not have given voluntary and knowing
consent.53 The court explained the mere naming of diagnostic labels was
insufficient to establish plaintiffs lack of capacity to consent. 4
Furthermore, the court found plaintiff was not under duress at that time,
and that plaintiff had forty-two days to examine the agreement and discuss
the consent form with others." Therefore, the court held plointiffs waiver
and release were voluntary. 6 Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997).
49Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997).
'Old. at 11.
SId
"
S2Id. at 13.
53Id.
S4Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9, 13 (Ist Cir. 1997).
551d.6Id. at 14.
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Physician's Disability Finding Insufficient Due to
Lack of Physical Examination
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District reversed the trial
court's decision and remanded the case in order to award plaintiffs
benefits. The court held plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in support
of her disabling condition. 7
Plaintiff was employed by the State Department of Public Health as
a toxicologist.58 Plaintiff's position was primarily a "sitting job."' 9 In
1994, plaintiff filed a claim for non-occupational disability benefits based
upon her physician's diagnosis of fibromylagia, which her physician
described as "a condition [producing] significant soft tissue pain as well
as a sleep disorder and irritable bowel."' 0 Defendant denied the claim
based upon a review of plaintiffs file, not a physical examination. 61
An attorney recommended that plaintiff see several different
physicians in order to obtain a variety of opinions. The physicians who
examined plaintiff agreed she suffered from a disabling condition,
although not all of them agreed to the extent of the disability.62
The court held the lower court have jurisdiction to overturn the Board
of Trustees' (Board) decision and also, that the Board's decision itself was
wrong.6 The court held the Board's decision should be overruled because
the decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 4 The
court found plaintiff presented enough evidence from a number of
physicians to show she was disabled due to fibromyalgia. s The court
further found the evidence produced by defendant was insufficient
because the evidence only involved a physician's review of the medical
file, and did not include a physical examination." The court reasoned the
S"Decastris v. State Employees Retirement Sys., 679 N.E.2d 825, 831-32 (II!. App.
1997).
'Id. at S26.
591d.
60 d. at 827.
6"Id.
"Decastris v. State Employees Retirement Sys., 679 N.E.2d 825, 827-28 (111. App.
1997).
6Id. at 830.
6Id. at 83 1.
6SId. at 830-3 1.
6"Id
1997] 917
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case did not involve a disagreement among experts, but rather an issue
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence presented.67 Decastris v. State
Employees Retirement Sys., 679 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. App. 1997).
DISCOVERY
Occurrence Reports Do Not Fall Under Work Product
Doctrine or Peer Review Statute
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that occurrence reports did not
constitute work product, were not protected by the peer review privilege
and, therefore, were discoverable.68
In December of 1991, a five and one-half month old minor was
diagnosed with an arachnoid cyst in the brain.69 The minor had thirteen
surgeries over the next three years, and his parents expressed displeasure
with the treatment rendered by defendant hospital.7" In 1996, the minor's
parents filed a claim against the hospital, alleging their son had suffered
a premature death due to negligent surgeries performed at the hospital.7'
In addition, the parents subpoenaed the hospital to release any incident
reports in connection with the treatment of their son. Defendant hospital
filed petitions for alternative writs of prohibition or mandamus
challenging the discovery of the occurrence reports.72
The court held the hospital could request alternative writs of
prohibition or mandamus for pretrial discovery when no other remedy
existed. 73 However, the court held occurrence reports did not fall under
the work product doctrine since the reports were created in the course of
ordinary business, rather than prepared in anticipation of litigation.74
Furthermore, the court held the occurrence reports did not fall under the
6Decastris v. State Employees Retirement Sys., 679 N.E.2d 825, 830 (I11. App. 1997).
6SColumbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 936 P.2d 844
(Nev. 1997).
69 d. at 845.701d.
711d.
721d. at 846.
73Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 936 P.2d 844,
847 (Nev. 1997).
741d. at 848.
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hospital peer review statute.75 The court stated the reports were only
protected by the peer review statute if the reports pertained to the internal
functioning of the committee.76 Due to the fact the occurrence reports
were merely factual statements of the events surrounding the treatment of
the minor, the court held the reports were not protected by the work
product doctrine or peer review statute.'77 ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare
Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 936 P.2d 844 (Nev. 1997).
Peer Review Discovery Limited: Documents Concerning
Physicians' Patients
The United States Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District,
responded to a motion to compel discovery of peer reviews by allowing
only the release of information related to plaintiff physician's patients.'
A physician lost his staff privileges based upon peer review committee's
decision, and subsequently sued the hospital as a result.7' During
discovery, plaintiff asked for production of all peer review documents
completed at the hospital for the previous ten years!9 The hospital
claimed the documents were privileged information, and thus, not
discoverable for any reason.8
The court agreed with the hospital, ruling the only discoverable
documents were those pertaining to plaintiff and his patients. The court
concluded the exception to the privilege relating to a hospital peer review
committee's documents was inapplicable to the case at bar for public
policy reasons. If the court decided to allow the requested information
to be discoverable, the legislature's intent to create more effective
"policing" through peer review committees would have been
75 Id.
76Id. at 849.
7Id. at 850-851.
'State ex rel. Health Midwest Development Group, Inc. v. Daugherty, No. WD 53927,
1997 Mo. App. LEXIS 859, at *10 (Mo. Ct. App. May 13, 1997).
79Id. at *1.
201d. at *2.
8'Id. at *3.
'State ex rel. Health Midwest Development Group, Inc. v. Daugherty, No. WD 53927,
1997 Mo. App. LEXIS 859, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App. May 13, 1997).
1997] 919
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contravened. 83 Therefore, the court reasoned the peer review committee's
view of other physicians' treatment of patients should not be subject to
discovery unless absolutely essential.?4 State ex rel. Health Midwest Dev.
Group v. Daugherty, No. WD 53927, 1997 LEXIS 859 (Mo. Ct App. May
13, 1997).
Pharmacist-Customer Privilege Not Recognized in Connecticut
The Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, ordered
a pharmacist to answer interrogatories because the pharmacist-customer
privilege was not recognized in Connecticut.85
Petitioner issued a civil investigative demand to respondent, a
licensed pharmacy in Connecticut, for allegedly engaging in unfair and
deceptive billing practices.86 Respondent filed a motion claimaing it should
not be required to respond to Interrogatories Numbers Seven and Eight."
These interrogatories required respondent to provide a list of names and
addresses of all customers, as well as the names of all accounts where the
pharmacy collected money directly from the customers.88 Respondent
argued its responses would violate the privacy of its patients, especially
those afflicted with HIV.89 Furthermore, respondent contended petitioner
did not have the statutory authority to request the information."0
The court held the pharmacist-customer privilege did not exist in
Connecticut. 91 The court concluded a civil investigative demand was
sufficient to require respondent to answer the interrogatories under the
Connecticut statute allowing pharmacists and pharmacies to reveal
information to government agencies. 92 The statute explicitly stated a
83Id.
14Id.
'
5Shiffrin v. I.V. Servs. of Am., No. CV 970568003S, 1997 WL 220093, at *3 (Conn.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 1997).
86Id.
87Id.
"Id.
"Id. at *1-2.
"Shiffrin v. I.V. Servs. of Am., No. CV 970568003S, 1997 WL 220093, at *1-2 (Conn.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 1997).
'Id. at *3.
92Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-626 (b)(5)).
920 [Vol 1:911
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pharmacist or pharmacy could provide records to "any government agency
with statutory authority to review or obtain such information.""
Therefore, the Superior Court of Connecticut ordered respondent to
answer petitioner's interrogatories. 4 Shiffrin . I. V Servs. ofArm., No. CV
970568003S, 1997 W-L 220093 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 1997).
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Reading Drug Test Results for Employment Purposes Is Not
A Medical Service Under the Medical Malpractice Act
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held the state's Medical Malpractice Act
is inapplicable to a physician who simply reads a drug test required by an
employer because the employee is not considered the physician's patient. 5
On February 16, 1995, the patient slipped and fell while at work. 5
The following day, the patient went to the hospital and was given a drug
screen, an employer mandated procedure following injuries sustained at
work.97 Defendant physician read and reported the positive results of the
drug test to the employer, and the employer subsequently terminated the
patient's employment. 9 The patient asserted defendant physician was
negligent for revealing the drug test results. 9
Defendant physician asserted the claim was covered by the Medical
Malpractice Act (Act) and thus, had to be reviewed by a medical review
panel before the action could be commenced in a court of law." The
court found the Act was inapplicable because the patient was not
technically a "patient" of defendant physician.'' In this case, defendant
was only reading the results of a drug test, not providing any medical
services.10 2 As a result, the Act was inapplicable, and the case did not
93Id. at *3.
941d. at *3.
9sPrice v. City, 693 So.2d 1169, 1170 (La. 1997).
951d.
9' Id.
"
3Id. at 1171.
Id.
"'Price v. City, 693 So.2d 1169, 1171-1172 (La. 1997).
34Id. at 1173.
1 1d.
1997]
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have to be first assessed by the medical review panel. 1°3 Price v. City, 693
So.2d 1169 (La. 1997).
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert Testimony Based on"Scientific Knowledge" .Admissible
The Supreme Court of Iowa remanded, holding the expert testimony was
admissible under the Daubert test since the testimony was based upon
"scientific knowledge," "based upon what [was] known."'10 4
Plaintiff, a patient, and her husband filed a claim against defendant
physician alleging the defendant was negligent because he did not offer
the plaintiff any treatment when she was exposed to chicken pox during
her pregnancy.10 5 Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that as a result of
defendant's negligence, their baby was born with blindness in one eye and
skin lesions.0 6 More specifically, plaintiffs argued defendant did not
provide proper antiviral therapy resulting in their son being born with
congenital varicella syndrome.1
0 7
The dispute in this case surrounded the question of whether
plaintiffs' expert witness should be allowed to testify at trial."S The
witness' theory asserted that had plaintiff been administered an antibody
to destroy the chicken pox virus, plaintiffs' son's symptoms could have
been prevented.'09
The court applied the Daubert test, inquiring whether the expert
theory:
(1) had been tested;
(2) had been subjected to peer review or publication;
(3) was generally accepted in the scientific community; and
10 3Id.
"'4Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 830 (Iowa 1997).
1051d.
106Id.
'°7Id. at 819.
'I8 d. at 821.
"~XWilliams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Iowa 1997).
[Vol 1:911922
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(4) had a known rate of error."
The court held the expert testimony should have been admitted because
the witness' theory had been recently published in a medical journal."'
Furthermore, the court stated the fact the witness' theory had not been
widely peer-reviewed did not necessarily render the theory as
scientifically invalid." 2 The court concluded the expert witness'
reasoning and methodology underlying his opinion relied upon "scientific
knowledge," "based upon what [was] known"." Williams v. Hedican,
561 N. W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997).
FOOD AND DRUG
Jury To Determine Whether Patient Was Adequately
Warned Regarding Dangers of Drug
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding a jury should
have the opportunity to determine whether plaintiff was adequately
warned regarding the adverse affects of the drug Tegison." 4
The plaintiff patient filed a claim against defendant drug
manufacturing company for failure to test and adequately warn against the
dangers of the drug Tegison, which was a prescription drug used to treat
severe recalcitrant psoriasis."' The package inserts included with the
medication warned of side effects, including eye irritations and blurred
vision." 6
Plaintiff had suffered from psoriasis since 1973, and visited a
dermatologist who prescribed Tegison from 1984 to 1990.1 7 During those
"Od. at 822 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595
(1993)).
.mId. at 829.
"'id. at 830.
"3id. at 831 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 590, 595
(1993)).
"
4Golod v. Hoffnan La Roche, 964 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
"1Sd. at 844.
"6Id. at 846.
17Id.
1997] 923
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years, plaintiff suffered from many side effects, including "eyelid
dermatitis," "drying of the eyes and mucous membranes," "peeling of the
palms and soles," "partial loss of hair," "disintegration of the fingernails,"
and "vitamin A poisoning.""' 8 Beginning in 1986, an opthamologist
monitored plaintiff, who was eventually considered legally blind in
1991.1'9 Plaintiff provided expert testimony to demonstrate her blindness
was caused by Tegison. 1
20
The first issue the court addressed was whether the suit was barred,
because the action had not been filed within three years of the date of
accrual.' 2 ' The action was filed on January 29, 1993, and plaintiff invoked
the "two-injury rule." The rule provided "diseases [sharing] a common
cause may nonetheless be held separate and distinct where their biological
manifestations [were] different and where the presence of one [was] not
necessarily a predicate for the other's development.' ' 22 Plaintiff asserted
the injuries prior to 1990 were different from the injuries sustained after
July of 1990, and therefore, she should not be time-barred from bringing
the action.
123
The court found the "two-injury rule" might be applicable since
defendant could not prove plaintiffs subsequent injuries were the result of
a "continuous progression" from her earlier experiences. 1,24 The court
concluded ajury should determine whether the injury was the result of a
continuous progression and thus, the claim was not time-barred.'25
Plaintiff next asserted defendant breached its duty to warn. 126 The
court found the Tegison warnings did not warn of the more serious and
permanent ophthalmic risks. 127 Accordingly, the court refused to grant
summary judgment in favor of defendant.2 8 The court also dismissed
defendant's claim that the company was not aware of the more serious
risks, since defendant had been placed on notice by the Food and Drug
"'Id. at 847.
"'Golod v. Hoffman La Roche, 964 F. Supp. 841, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
1201d.
12id. at 850 (citing N.Y.CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(5)).
'2Id. at 850-851 (citing Fusaro v. Porter Hayden Co., 548 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1989)).
"2'Id. at 851.
"
4Golod v. Hoffman La Roche, 964 F.Supp. 841, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
'Id.
'26Id. at 853.
'27Id. at 855.
'2id. at 856.
924 [Vol 1:911
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Administration (FDA) and the Adverse Experience Reports.' Golod v.
Hoffinan La Roche, 964 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
INSURANCE
Policy May Be Terminated If Insured Provides False
Information on Application
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs claim
for rescission of the contract.1 3' However, the court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment on his counterclaim that the insurance
policy's "AIDS cap" violated Title III of the American with Disabilities
Act (ADA).13'
When defendant applied and purchased insurance, he failed to note
his EIV-positive status on the application. 3 2 Plaintiff insurance company
later took over defendant's policy from his original insurer'3  Plaintiff
then discovered defendant fraudulently represented his HIV-positive status
on his application, and instituted this action to terminate defendant's plan
due to the misrepresentation. 134  Defendant counterclaimed, stating
plaintiff violated the American Disabilities Act (ADA) by placing a
$5,000 maximum lifetime benefit for AIDS treatment. 3
The court found the contract was clear and unambiguous regarding
its fraud policy by stating the policy would be void if based upon
intentional misrepresentations. 36 The court found defendant had agreed
to these terms, and that a new contract was not created when plaintiff took
over his policy.137 Accordingly, the court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment for plaintiffs rescission of the contract."' The court
1 9Golod v. Hoffman La Roche, 964 F.Supp. 841, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
t
"Vorld Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F.Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997).13id.
"
2 d. at 1204.
133Id. at 1205.
14Id.
13"5 Vorld Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F.Supp. 1203, 1205-06 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
1361d
137Id. at 1206.3 id. at 1206-07.
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further found defendant was considered disabled under the ADA since he
was afflicted with AIDS, and that plaintiff was a place of public
accommodation because an insurer's operations affect commerce.'39 The
court concluded plaintiffs cap on AIDS treatment was &scriminatory,
because plaintiff did not present evidence to justify the cap.14' Therefore,
the court held plaintiffhad violated the ADA.141 World Ins. Co. v. Branch,
966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga.1997).
Employer's Insurance Plan Covered by ERISA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held the
employer's insurance plan for its employees was covered by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) because the employer's
purchase of disability insurance was part of a comprehensive insurance
program and not an isolated occurrence.142  The court also held the
employee's claim under the Oklahoma bad faith law was within the scope
of ERISA, thus entitling the employee to long-term disability benefits.
43
In June of 1992, four months after her employer had hired her, the
plaintiff employee slipped on wet concrete while at work, resulting in a
lower back injury.' 44 She visited several physicians over the summer, but
none were able to find an exact cause for her condition.145 In October of
1992, plaintiff filed a disability claim, asserting she was unable to work
as of October 13, 1992.146 She was terminated by defendant employer two
days later.' 47
Defendant authorized payment for plaintiffs treatment extending
over a two-week period during November of 1992.148 Defendant
requested a medical examination of plaintiff in January of 1993; and, at
1391d.
140WorId Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1206-07 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
1411d. at 1209.
142GayIor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 460,464 (10th Cir. 1997).1431d.
'"Id
1451d.
1'4Id. at 462.
'47Gaylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1997).
1"Id. at 463.
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that time, the physician was once again unable to verify the cause of her
condition.1 49 In March of 1993, plaintiffs physician recommended she
return to a general practitioner for her long-term treatment; although, due
to financial reasons, the plaintiff was unable to do so.15 Defendant's
insurance plan subsequently denied plaintiffs claim for additional
benefits, because she was not under the care of a physician. As a result,
plaintiff filed suit. 5'
Plaintiff argued defendant's insurance policy did not fall under the
"employee welfare plan" and, thus, was not covered by ERISA 2 The
court held the defendant's policy fell under ERISA since defendant
intended to provide benefits to its employees over a long period of time.'5-
Furthermore, the court held the policy fell under ERISA, because the
defendant's policy was part of a comprehensive insurance program, not
an isolated occurrence. 
1 4
Plaintiff asserted that even if the plan was governed by ERISA, her
claim under the Oklahoma bad faith statute was not exempted by ERISA's
"saving clause," which states that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities."' 55 In order to determine
whether the Oklahoma state law regulated the insurance business within
the meaning of the "savings clause," the court applied the following three-
prong test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedearex:
(1) whether the law transferred or spread the policyholder's risk;
(2) whether the law was an integral part of the policy relationship between
the insurer and the insured; and
(3) whether the law was limited to entities within the insurance
industry.1 56
'
491d. at 462.
' °Id. at 463.
511d.
'"2Gaylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 460,463 (10th Cir. 1997).
1531d. at 464.
'4Id.
'
5 Id. at 465.
'"
61d. (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedearex, 481 U.S. 41, 4849, (1987)).
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The court found the Oklahoma bad faith law did not sufficiently regulate
insurance and, thus, did not fall within the ambit of ERISA's "saving
clause. 1
57
In addition, the court found defendant could not deny plaintiff of
employee benefits, simply because plaintiff was not under the care of a
physician due to her financial circumstances. 58 The court also determined
plaintiff suffered from a disabling condition, even though physicians could
not identify an exact etiology. The court, therefore, held plaintiff was
entitled to long-term disability benefits. 5 9 Gaylor v. John HancockMut.
Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 460 (1Oth Cir. 1997).
Insurer Entitled to Reimbursement Only After
the Insured Was Fully Compensated
The Supreme Court of Arkansas held the insurance company was entitled
to reimbursement only after the insured was compensated in full. 6
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and filed suit against
the other driver for negligence. 161 Plaintiff eventually settled with the
other driver's insurance company for $25,000, the maximum amount of
the policy, because the other driver had no appreciable assets.
162
Plaintiffs total damages were in excess of $400,000.' 3 Because a
subrogation agreement had been signed between plaintiff and his own
insurance carrier, the trial court held plaintiffs insurance company was
entitled to the $25,000. 64
The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling, reasoning an
insurer was entitled to reimbursement from subrogation agreements only
after the insured had been completely reimbursed. 65 The court ruled that
because plaintiff still had outstanding expenses, he was entitled to the
's7Gaylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 460, 466 (10th Cir. 1997).
'
81d. at 467.
1591d.
'"Franklin v. Healthsource of Arkansas, 942 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Ark. 1997).
'
6id. at 838.
'
62Id. at 839.
163Id.
'6"Id. at 840.
6Franklin v. Healthsource of Arkansas, 942 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Ark. 1997).
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$25,000 from the policy. 66 The court explained allowing an insurance
company to enforce an agreement of this nature would undermine the
bargaining power of the insured.167 Franidin v. Healihsource of Arkansas,
942 S. 2d 837 (Ark 1997).
JURISDICTION
Physician's Transfer of Patient to to Facility Within State
Insufficient to Establish Personal Jurisdiction
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held the
physician's contacts with the state were insufficient for the state to
exercise long-arm jurisdiction. 163
Plaintiff, the patient's husband, filed a wrongful death suit against
defendant physician in a Missouri court. 69 Defendant was served in
Kansas and moved to dismiss the case alleging the court lacked personal
jurisdiction.70 The patient was a Kansas resident, and was admitted to a
Kansas hospital under defendant's care after she began to experience chest
pains.171 When defendant was performing a cardiac cauterization on the
patient, she experienced cariogenic shock requiring emergency cardiac
surgery. 72 Defendant subsequently made arrangements for the patient to
be transferred to a hospital in Missouri because the Kansas hospital was
not equipped to care for the patient."7 The patient was then transferred to
the Missouri hospital where she died the next day. 74
Defendant argued his principal place of business was in Kansas, and
he only accompanied the patient to Missouri once in 1975.175 However,
plaintiff argued defendant had minimum contacts with the state of
Missouri because he entered into an employment contract with a Missouri
165Id. at 841.
'I'Id.
'cMarler v. Hiebert, 943 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
'
9Id. at 855.
1701d.
17Id
"17Id.
"Marler v. Hiebert, 943 SAV.2d 853, 855 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
174id.
1751d.
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corporation, and had transferred the patient to a Missouri hospital. 7 6 In
determining a due process violation did not exist, the court applied the
following factors:
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state;
(2) the quantity of the contacts with the forum state;
(3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts, and of secondary
importance;
(4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents;
and
(5) the convenience to the parties. 77
The court concluded the patient was not a Missouri resident, the entire
treatment took place in Kansas, and defendant's employment contract with
a Missouri corporation did not affect the patient's treatment. 178
Plaintiff also alleged defendant's telephone call and the sending of
records to Missouri constituted minimum contacts with the state of
Missouri. 179 The court disagreed because defendant was not seeking
advice from a Missouri physician and the Missouri physician had not
charged a fee; instead, defendant's actions merely concerned the patient's
transfer to another hospital.8 0 Therefore, the court held defendant's
actions were not enough to constitute minimum contacts with the State of
Missouri, and that the State of Missouri did not have personal jurisdiction
over defendant physician.' s' Marler v Hiebert, 943 S. W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997).
176d.
"Id. at 857 (citing Mead v. Conn, 845 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Mo. App. 1993)).
1781d. at 857.
179Marler v. Hiebert, 943 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
'sold.
1811d.
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LICENSE TO PRACTICE
Misrepresentation About Degrees Basis for Criminal
Conviction of Consumer Fraud
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District affirmed the trial
court's findings that defendant's misrepresentation as a licensed physician
and doctor of philosophy was sufficient to be considered criminal." z
Defendant responded to an advertisement for a quality assurance and
research coordinator position by sending a resume that indicated she was
a candidate for a combined M.D./Ph.D. program.b 3 Defendant was
subsequently interviewed and hired for the position.' Letterheads,
business cards, and defendant's nametag all depicted defendant's name
followed by the designation "M.D./Ph.D."' 5 When she was introduced
as "Doctor," defendant made no attempt to correct the title, and on at least
one occasion insisted on being referred to as "Doctor."'1
Defendant's occupational duties included taking and writing up
patients' complaints, analyzing patient questionnaires, and reporting the
outcomes to the medical director. 87 When the director became aware of
the fact defendant had never obtained a M.D. or Ph.D., he fired
defendant.18
Defendant argued she never instructed anyone that she was licensed
to practice medicine. s9 She also argued that although she did author
letters on letterhead indicating she was a licensed physician, she never
acted in the capacity of a physician.' The court upheld the trial court's
decision and found defendant guilty because she knowingly and
intentionally represented herself to be involved in the practice of medicine
without having any of the requisite qualifications.' 9' The court noted the
legislature specifically aimed to prohibit this type of behavior, regardless
"'State v. Doneski, 679 N.E.2d 462 (Il1. App. CL 1997).
"31d. at 464.
184Id.
185M.
"
M Id.
'87State v. Doneski, 679 N.E.2d 462, 464 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
'""Id. at 464-65.
lS9Id at 465.
193id.
191 d
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of whether defendant's actions resulted in compounded criminal
actions. 92 State v. Doneski, 679 N.E.2d 462 (1ll. App. Ct. 1997).
MEDICAL EDUCATION
Medical Resident Has No Right to Counsel or Transcript of
Hearing in Academic Termination
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held a medical resident was not entitled
to counsel at an academic termination hearing, nor could the hearing be
transcribed. 93
Plaintiff, a second-year medical resident, was terminated by the
program director of defendant hospital for "academic reasons.' 9 4 The
hospital maintained the resident lacked clinical judgment, leadership,
professionalism with other staff members, and guidance to her interns. 9 s
After termination, the resident challenged the director' s decision, 196 and
demanded the presence of her attorney at the hearing.' 97 The trial court
ruled in favor of the resident on both issues, and the appellate court
affirmed. 198
On final appeal, defendant hospital argued the lower court's decisions
should be reversed because the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies
required the parties to utilize internal proceedings prior to seeking judicial
intervention.'99 The court held the resident did not have the right to
counsel at an academic termination hearing and the hearing did not have
to be transcribed.2" The Court reasoned that if academic termination
hearings were transformed into legal proceedings, the hearings would
become an adversarial and litigious contest.2' Accordingly, the court
"State v. Doneski, 679 N.E.2d 462, 467 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
'
93Hemandez v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971 (N.J. 1997).
1941d. at 972.
19sId
"
1961d.
'
971d. at 973.
98Hemandez v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971, 973 (N.J. 1997).
'2Id.
201Id.2
°
1id. at 976.
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reversed the lower court's rulings.22 Hernandez v. Overlook Hosp., 692
A.2d 971 (N.J. 1997).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Adult Children May Not Sue for Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress on Parent Patients
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held adult children may not maintain
an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from their
parent's injuries in a medical malpractice case.23
Plaintiffs' mother was admitted to the hospital with complaints of
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal cramping, abdominal distention,
and fever.2 4 A few days later, their mother was transferred to another
hospital's intensive care unit. Approximately four months later, plaintiffs'
mother died as a result of an incarcerated abdominal wall hernia.2 5
Plaintiffs argued they suffered mental anguish and emotional distress
as a result of seeing their mother's suffering, which was allegedly due to
the physician's failure to properly care for their mother.20  Plaintiffs filed
a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendant
physician.207
In Wisconsin, minor children may file suit based upon negligent
infliction of emotional distress, however, the issue was whether adult
children could maintain a similar suit?13 The court held adult children of
injured patients could not assert such a claim.62o The court reasoned
minor children are more likely to be adversely affected by negligent injury
to a parent than adult children.210 The court also looked to the legislative
intent and concluded the legislature had not intended for adult children to
file claims for emotional distress suffered by their parents when
202 d. at 977.
..
3Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 565 NAV.2d 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
2
'4Id. at 165.
2051d.
2Id.2071d.
"ZZiulkowski v. Nierengarten, 565 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
2 id. at 166.21Old.
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patients.l1 Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 565 N. W.2d 164, 165 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1997).
Mishandling of Bone Marrow Cells Not Covered
by Medical Malpractice Act
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the
trial court's decision that the mishandling of a canister containing bone
marrow cells did not fall under the ambit of the Medical Malpractice
Act.
2 12
Plaintiffs son was diagnosed with neuroblastoma, a cancerous
tumor.213  His treatment involved a bone marrow harvest and
reimplantation procedure.214 The bone marrow cells were harvested from
the child at a hospital in New Orleans, and then sent to a hospital in
Florida where the cancerous cells could be purged.21 After this occurred,
the Florida hospital shipped the frozen cells back to the New Orleans
hospital via Federal Express in a canister surrounded by liquid nitrogen.l
During shipment, the canister was damaged causing the cells to thaw.2
17
Therefore, the cells could not be used in the reimplantation procedure.2 18
Plaintiffs filed suit against Federal Express and the hospital in New
Orleans.
Defendant hospital argued the suit was premature because the claims
had not been reviewed by the medical review panel as required by the
Medical Malpractice Act.219 The Supreme Court of Louisiana set forth
three factors in determining whether a statute falls under the Medical
Malpractice Act:
(1) whether the particular wrong [was] "treatment related" or caused by
a dereliction of professional skill;
2 1
'id. at 167.2 12Hebert v. Federal Express, 695 So.2d 528, 529 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
2131d.
2 14
1d.2151d.216Id.
2"Hebert v. Federal Express, 695 F.2d 528, 529 (La. Ct. App. 1997).2 181d.
2 191d.
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(2) whether the wrong require[d] expert medical evidence to determine
whether the appropriate standard of care was breached; and
(3) whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the
patient's condition. '
The court concluded the situation in this case did not meet the criteria
set forth in Seivell.22 The court stated the mishandling of a canister was
not "treatment related," and expert medical evidence would not be
required to determine if the New Orleans hospital had breached the
appropriate standard of care. Therefore, this incident was not covered by
the Medical Malpractice Act.m Hebert v. Federal Express, 695 So.2d 528
(La. Ct. App. 1997).
Hospitals Entitled to Reimbursement for Lower-Level
Care When In-Patient Care No Longer Necessary
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held health
care providers were entitled to reimbursement by the state for providing
lower level care even though in-patient, acute care was no longer
required.2
Plaintiffs, two hospitals, provided in-patient psychiatric care to adult
and adolescent patients under Florida's medicaid program.z2  The
hospitals were denied payment by the Agency Health Care Administration
for patient grace days under circumstances in which no alternative
facilities were available for the patients who no longer needed in-patient,
acute treatment.m Plaintiff's claim stated the state's medicaid plan was
violative of the Boren Amendment, which requires
(1) patient' s reasonable access to facilities of adequate quality, and
(2) reasonable and adequate reimbursement to health care providers for
costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities.
"Id. at 530 (citing Sewell v. Doctor's Hosp., 600 So.2d 577 (La. 1992).
221ld.
'
2 Hebert v. Federal Express, 695 F.2d 528, 529 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
2
'Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Medical Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693 (11th Cir. 1997).
2241d.
"Id. at 694.
2id.
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Plaintiffs stated they were forced to retain patients who were ready for
discharge from in-patient care; because alternative settings, for which the
state was responsible, were not available.227
The court held the state's medicaid plan violated the Boren
Amendment.228 The court reasoned that the hospitals had no other
alternative because the patients were not ready for unsupervised settings,
such as their homes.229 The court also stated the hospitals could not
discriminate against adolescent psychiatric patients upon admission
despite the likelihood of future grace days.230 Tallahassee Mem ' Reg 7
Medical Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693 (11th Cir.1997).
Obstetrician Enrolled in Florida's NICA Plan
Must Give Patient Predelivery Notice
The Supreme Court of Florida held an obstetrician who was enrolled in
Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (NICA)
plan was required to give the patient predelivery notice of his participation
in the plan before her remedy could be limited by the plan.2 31
Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice suit against defendant
obstetrician, alleging defendant's negligence during delivery caused their
daughter's severe neurological impairment and permanent brain damage. 2 2
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing plaintiffs were limited to
an administrative remedy under the NICA plan.2 33 However, plaintiffs
claimed they were not given pre-delivery notice as required by the NICA;
and, thus, their suit was not precluded.3
The court held a patient must be given pre-delivery notice of the
provider's participation in the NICA plan before the patient's remedy can
27Id.
2"Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 704 (1 Ith
Cir.1997).
229id. at 702.
3Old.
"'Galen of Florida, Inc. V. Braniff, 906 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1997).
21d. at 308-309.23id.
234Id.
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be limited by the plan.2 5 The court stated the statute required giving
notice to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological
injuries in order for a patient to make an informed decision regarding
whether or not to use a particular provider participating in the plan.216
This notice requirement was clear from the recommendation of the
Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems (Task
Force).237 The Task Force stated that unlike Virginia legislation, the
notice requirement was justified on the basis of constitutionality and
faimess.23S Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 906 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1997).
Acceptance of Trial Court's Award of Damages
Waived Right to Appeal
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
and held the plaintiff patient waived the right to appeal her claim against
defendant pathologist when plaintiff had accepted defendant's payment of
the judgment.239 The court also held the trial court appropriately awarded
defendant radiologist's costs of attorneys' fees because the negligence
claim against him was frivolous.240
Plaintiff was seen by a urologist for her urinary problems, resulting
in partial removal of her left kidney.241 Plaintiff also underwent tests for
a cyst on her right kidney.242 Although the reports of the radiologist were
accurate, defendant pathologist misdiagnosed the aspirated specimen as
cancerous, causing removal of her right kidney.2 43 Plaintiff sued the
pathologist, radiologist, urologist, and the medical college for
negligence. 244
25 d. at 309-310.
"'Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 906 So.2d 308, 309-310 (Fla. 1997).
2'Id.23BId.
" Riley v. Lawson, 565 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Vis. 1997).
2'Id.
241Id.
'
42Id.
243Id.
'Riley v. Lawson, 565 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Wis. 1997).
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After unsuccessful mediation, the case resulted in a bench trial,245 in
which the trial court found only defendant pathologist was causally
negligent. Plaintiff subsequently accepted the damages she was
awarded.246 The trial court also awarded defendant radiologist attorney's
fees and costs because the claim against the radiologist was ruled
frivolous.247 On appeal, the court held plaintiff had no right to appeal
against defendant radiologist because plaintiff had accepted his payment
of damages.248  The court also affirmed the trial court's award of
attorneys' fees and costs due to the patient's frivolous suit against the
radiologist.249 Riley v. Lawson, 565 N. W.2d 266 (Wis. 1997).
MENTAL HEALTH
Involuntary Commitment Order Upheld Not
Simultaneous Psychotropic Medication Order
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District upheld a trial
court's ruling that due to the evidence presented, respondent was in need
of involuntary commitment. However, the appellate court reversed the
order, approving the administration of psychotropic medication.250
The trial court found respondent was in need of involuntary
admission to a mental health facility and required psychotropic
medication.251 Respondent appealed, stating this ruling violated her due
process rights and that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's
order.252 Respondent claimed her due process rights were violated,
because one hearing decided the issues of both involuntary admission and
administration of psychotropic drugs.253 The appellate court declined to
use the waiver doctrine in the matter of drug administration, because
respondent's counsel had no notice of the issue before trial and he was not
2451d.
246 r
"24
7Id.
2481d.
241Riley v. Lawson, 565 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Vis. 1997).
"'°State v. Robinson, 679 N.E.2d 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
2'31 d. at 819.
'
2Id. at 820.
3 rd.
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prepared to argue the point." 4 Accordingly, the trial court's medication
order was vacated.255
The appellate court, however, applied the waiver doctrine to the
involuntary commitment issue, because notice was given to respondent's
counsel. The appellate court held sufficient evidence supported the
commitment of respondent to a mental health facilityY. 6 The evidence
demonstrated respondent was reasonably expected to inflict injury upon
herself due to her mental illness. 7 This evidence included the testimony
of respondent's psychiatrist, the assistant director of a health facility, as
well as respondent's own incoherent testimony.2s State v. Robinson, 679
N.E.2d 818, 821 (1i1. App. Ct. 1997).
Physician's Prescribing Medication on Basis of Telephone
Interview Proximately Caused Patient's Suicide
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held the evidence which illustrated the
patient's suicide was foreseeable, and concluded the internist's failure to
render adequate care was a proximate cause of her death.2 9
Plaintiff was treated by defendant physician from 1981 to 1987 for
recurring clinical depression.26 Plaintiff telephoned defendant's office in
October of 1988 complaining of depression.2 1 An internist who practiced
with defendant answered the telephone call without reviewing plaintiff s
records, or speaking with defendant.262 Plaintiff indicated to the internist
during the telephone conversation that she was depressed, and the internist
prescribed 100 pills of Tofranil with two refills. 63 Approximately eight
2'4MId. at 821.
25 State v. Robinson, 679 N.E.2d 818, 821 (Il. App. Ct. 1997).2RId. at 823.
'7Id. at 824.
29Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266 (Conn. 1997).
260Id. at 1268.
2611d.
262 d.2631d.
1997] 939
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
days later, plaintiff committed suicide by taking an overdose of the
Tofranil pills prescribed by the internist.2 4
At trial, plaintiff provided an expert witness who testified the
internist's actions fell below the accepted standard of care by prescribing
Tofranil over the telephone without examining the patient or reviewing
her file.265 The court found plaintiffs suicide was a foreseeable result of
the internist's tortious conduct.266 Furthermore, the court held the internist
could be held liable for the patient's suicide since he should have known
of the risk of suicide, and also found his actions were the proximate cause
of the suicide.267
Defendant argued plaintiff's suicide was a result of an irresistible
impulse, thereby arguing they could not be held liable.268 However, the
court held the expert medical testimony presented by plaintiff at trial was
sufficient to establish medical malpractice, and concluded the internist's
actions fell below the accepted standard of care for internists.269 Edwards
v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266 (Conn. 1997).
NEGLIGENCE
Evaluating Psychiatrist Owed No Duty
to Accused Sexual Abuser
The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the district court's decision that
the evaluating psychiatrist did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff, a
suspected sexual abuser.2 70 Plaintiff was sued for divorce, 271 and during
the divorce process, plaintiffs wife accused him of sexually abusing their
children.272 Defendant psychiatrist videotaped sessions with the children
and then submitted an edited version to the parties' attorney3.273 Plaintiff
26EdVards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1268 (Conn. 1997).
26Id. at 1270.
26Id.
26id. at 1271.2681d.
269Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Conn. 1997).27 Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781, 785 (Conn. 1997).
27'Id. at 78 1.2721d.
2731d.
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was later acquitted of the criminal sexual abuse charges 7 4 Plaintiff
argued the sexual abuse trial would not have continued if defendant
psychiatrist had not given the edited tape to the attorneys.7 S
The primary issue in the case was whether a psychiatrist owed a duty
of care to the accused to exercise reasonable care in the performance of the
evaluation. 6 The appellate court held a duty of care was owed only
when harm was foreseeable by an ordinary person in that particular
situation.277 The court held to impose such a duty would discourage
professionals from performing sexual abuse evaluations of children
altogether for fear of liability.278 Although a wrongly accused sexual
abuser could be found guilty based upon a psychiatrist's erroneous
evaluation, public policy deemed that risk was more acceptable than
allowing child abuse to go undetected.27 9 Zamstein v. Mar asti, 692 A.2d
781 (Conn. 1997).
No Connection Between Veteran's Cancer
and Exposure to Ionizing Radiation
The United States Court of Veteran Appeals affirmed a decision made by
the Board of Veteran's Appeals, holding the veteran's skin and colon
cancer were not connected to his exposure to ionizing radiation in the
military service.210 The court held plaintiff did not provide competent
medical evidence in support of a causal connection between his cancer and
his radiation exposure.2 1
Plaintiff served on active duty from 1942 to 1946.22 He was
diagnosed with carcinoma of the sigmoid colon in 1987, and with basal
cell carcinoma in 1991.283 Plaintiff filed a claim in 1991, alleging the two
types of cancer were a result of his former exposure to ionizing radiation
274Id.
275Zamnstein v. Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781,782 (Conn. 1997).
2761d. at 783.
27id at 785.
27'Id. at 786.
279Id. at 787.
2'Davis v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 209 (Vet. App. 1997).
2"Id. at 210.
mId.
"Id.
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while in the service. 2' After analyzing plaintiffs DNA, a medical director
determined the colon and skin cancer were not linked to plaintiffs
exposure to ionizing radiation while in the service. 85
The court agreed with the medical director's findings, and found
plaintiff did not provide any evidence to prove a connection between the
cancer and the radiation.28 6 The veteran alleged the requisite dosage levels
for establishing a connection barred the possibility of finding a connection
between exposure to radiation in the service and the development of
cancer.287 The court held plaintiffs colon and skin cancer were not
connected to his exposure of ionizing radiation in the service, reasoning
plaintiff did not prove any deficiency in the dosage regulations.2 88 Davis
v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 209 (Vet. App. 1997).
Sexual Relationship with Counselor Sufficient For
Claim of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held plaintiff had presented
enough evidence of physical injury to satisfy the claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, medical and professional malpractice, and
negligent hiring, training, and supervision.
289
Plaintiff, a cocaine addict, was admitted to the Psychiatric Institute
of Washington (PIW) for treatment.29 At PIW, plaintiff developed a
sexual relationship with one of her counselors.29' Plaintiff continued her
relationship with the counselor and became pregnant with his child.292
When her relationship with the counselor ended, plaintiff sought damages
for emotional and mental distress suffered during the pregnancy and child
birth, as well as economic losses secondary to the distress."'3
2841d.285Davis v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 209, 212 (Vet. App. 1997).
2861d. at 213.2871d.
2881d.289Morgan v. Psychiatric Inst. Of Wash., 692 A.2d 417 (D.C. 1997).
290ld"
291 d.
"292Id
"2 9 3
Id. at 418.
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The trial court held physical injury was required to sustain an action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 294 The appellate court held
plaintiff's sexual relationship with the counselor and the counselor's
exploitation of the transference phenomenon satisfied the requirement of
physical injury for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 295
Therefore, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the counselor as to the claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and medical and professional malpractice.296 The appellate court
also reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the P1W
regarding the issue of negligent hiring, training, and supervision.297
Morgan v. Psychiatric Inst.- of Wash., 692 A.2d 417 (D. C. 1997).
REIMBURSEMENT
For Reimbursement, Medical Facilities Must Comply with
Regulatory Standards of the Board of Medical Examiners
The Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower court's decision that a
provider must comply with the regulatory standards of the Board of
Medical Examiners in order to be reimbursed for its services.2 98
Defendant operated mobile testing services for evaluating orthopedic
injuries. 299 The tests were administered by exercise physiologists."'
Plaintiff, an insurance company, claimed the services rendered by
defendant did not fall under the provisions governing personal injury
protection coverage.30 1
The court reasoned defendant facility did not meet the regulatory
requirements since the facility was not owned by or under the
responsibility of a licensed physician.30 2 Furthermore, the court found
"
4Morgan v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., 692 A.2d 417, 418 (D.C. 1997).
2951d. at 421.
'961d. at 422.297jd"
298Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic Evaluations Inc., 693 A.2d 500, 504 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997).
2991d. at 501.3001d"
'1d. at 500.
3 21d. at 501-02.
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defendant facility's testing was not performed under the authority of a
physician, who should have created a protocol as well as a quality
assurance program.303 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic Evaluations Inc.,
693 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
SETTLEMENT
Patient Allowed Recovery from Patient's Compensation Fund
Based upon Combined Settlement with Multiple Defendants
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the trial court's ruling and allowed
a patient to recover from the Patient's Compensation Fund because his
combined settlement with two physicians and a psychiatric clinic
exceeded the minimum amount of $100,000.304
The patient filed a medical malpractice claim against two
psychiatrists, referring to their original business name, and settled the case
before trial. 0 5 During the period of medical treatment, the physicians
changed their business name, and one of the psychiatrists left the newly
named business before settlement.0 6 Neither the original business nor the
newly named business was qualified as a health provider under the
Medical Malpractice Act, although both psychiatrists were individually
qualified.30 7
The terms of the settlement listed the second business name as being
defendant, thereby dismissing the two physicians and their original
business name.308 The same insurance carrier insured all of defendants
against medical malpractice.3" Since the insurance policy failed to cover
plaintiff's entire claim, he filed a claim against the Patient's
Compensation Fund (Fund).310  The trial court dismissed that claim
3'Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic Evaluations Inc., 693 A.2d 500, 502 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997).
34Smith v. Pancer, 679 N.E.2d 893, 897 (Ind. 1997).3OId. at 894.
306Id.
3 Id. at 894-95.
308 d
3°OSrith v. Pancer, 679 N.E.2d 893, 894-95 (Ind. 1997).
31OId. at 895.
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because the second business named was not a qualified medical provider
under the Fund.31'
The appellate court reversed, holding the physicians agreed to settle
the claim through their insurance carrier, which triggered access to the
Fund. The court stated that as long as one of the qualified defendants
agreed to settle, the Fund was activated even though the amount
attributable to each defendant did not exceed $100,000. 3  Smith V.
Pancer, 679 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1997).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations Commences
on the Date of Physician's Negligent Act
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant physician, holding the case was
barred by the statute of limitations under the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act (Act). 4
The patient had a history of obstructive lung disease, and had made
numerous visits to the Veteran's Administration Hospital.315 Defendant
physician reported no changes were evident in comparing the chest x-rays
taken in June, 1987 and March, 1992.316 The patient was subsequently
diagnosed with lung cancer in October, 1993.f' The patient subsequently
hired an attorney to investigate a potential medical malpractice claim. In
January, 1995, his attorney reported the physician had negligently read the
chest x-ray taken in 1992."' In May, 1995, the patient died and his family
members filed suit against defendant physician. 9
11d. at 894-95.
121d. at 896.
rd. at 897.
3'4Streetman v. Nguyen, S43 SAV.2d 168 (Tex. CL App. 1997).
3'51d. at 170.
3161d.
317Id.
3181d
319Streetman v. Nguyen, 843 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Ct App. 1997).
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Defendant asserted the claim was barred by the Act, which provided
no health care liability claims could be commenced unless suit was filed
within two years from the date of the medical treatment at issue.32 0 The
court concluded the patient's only contact with defendant was in March
of 1992 and thus, the limitations period began to run at that time.321
Plaintiffs argued they did not have the opportunity to discover the
defendant's misdiagnosis until the statute of limitations had already
tolled.322 Plaintiffs further contended the Act was violative of the Texas
Constitution.32
3
Although the court acknowledged the Act had been previously held
unconstitutional, the court found plaintiffs did not fulfill the requisite
criteria in this case.324 Specifically, the first criterion required plaintiffs
to demonstrate a well-recognized common law action was being
restricted.325 The court reasoned that since plaintiffs' death and survival
action claims were "purely statutory in nature," the first criterion was not
satisfied.326  Therefore, the court awarded summary judgment to
defendant, holding plaintiffs did not file their claim in a timely matter.32 7
Streetman v. Nguyen, 943 S. W.2d 168 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
Statute of Limitations Triggered When Patient Led to Believe
Injury Is Related to Medical Treatment
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District held granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment was appropriate because the
statute of limitations had expired prior to the filing of the lawsuit 2
Subsequent to being resuscitated after suffering cardiopulmonary
arrest on June 6, 1992, plaintiff complained of mental confusion, memory
320,,d.
32id. at 171.
3221d.
3'Id.
124Streetman v. Nguyen, 843 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
3261d
"
327Id
32 Winters v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 71110, 1997 WL 218416, al * 1, 3 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 1, 1997).
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loss, excessive thirst, and excessive urination.329 Plaintiff filed suit on
December 17, 1993, claiming inadequate medical management caused his
cardiac arrest, resulting in his memory loss and mental confusion.
330
Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed without prejudice and was refiled on
December 8, 1994.331 The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on July 29, 1996, due to plaintiffs failure to file
within the statute of limitations period. 32 Plaintiff appealed, arguing the
statute of limitations may be tolled during the time a person was of
unsound mind.3
33
In evaluating the accrual of the statute of limitations, the court relied
on Allenius v. Thomas,334 which combined the three prongs of the
Hershberger test. The court held a cognizable event was required and
would have placed plaintiff on notice to pursue possible remedies for his
medical condition.335 Plaintiff attributed his unexplained memory loss to
the event occurring on June 6, 1992, which put him on notice.
336
Therefore, the statute of limitations began running on June 6, 1992.337
Because the original complaint was filed on December 17, 1993, almost
six months after the one year statute of limitations had run out, plaintiffs
case was time-barred.338 Winters v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 71110,
1997 WL 218416 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
A Complaint Correcting the Name of a Party Is Untimely
When Filed After the Statute of Limitations Has Tolled
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and dismissed plaintiffs
complaint, concluding a survival action had not been timely com-
329Id.
330Id.
3'3d. at *2.
332Id
133Winters v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 71110 1997 WL 218416, at *1, 2 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 1, 1997).
34 Id. (citing Allenius v. Thomas, 538 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio 1989)).
"3'Id. at *3.
335Id. at *4.
337Id
3"'Winters v. Cleveland Found., No. 71110, 1997 WL 218416, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 1, 1997).
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menced.339 In this case, a writ of summons naming the decedent's estate
as plaintiff was filed before the statute of limitations expired, but the
complaint naming the executor of the estate as plaintiff was filed after the
statute of limitations had expired.
The decedent was hospitalized for the treatment of meningitis at
Northwest Medical Center from September 11, 1992 until October 15,
1992.340 The decedent died on June 12, 1994."4' A writ of summons
naming the estate of the decedent as plaintiff was filed on September 8,
1994. The executor of the decedent's estate subsequently commenced an
action against the hospital and treating physicians by filing a complaint
naming himself as plaintiff.342 The complaint alleged defendant hospital
and physicians had negligently treated the decedent causing her to suffer
a stroke and paralysis.343
The issue before the court was whether the action was timely filed,
because the complaint correcting the name of the party was filed after the
statute of limitations had expired.3 " In order to file the complaint in
compliance with the rules of discovery, plaintiff would have needed
permission of the opposing party. Plaintiff failed to obtain this permission
and defendants objected.345
The first issue was whether the trial court erred in failing to recognize
that under the discovery rules, an issue of fact existed as to when the
statute of limitations began to run.346 The court held plaintiff waived the
issue by failing to raise the issue at trial.347 The second issue was whether
the trial court erred in failing to accede the statute of limitations was
extended by the Probate Code to one year after the decedent's death.348
The court examined the legislative intent and concluded the Probate Code
extension was inapplicable to the present case.349
33'Prevish v. Northwest Medical Ctr., 692 A.2d 192, 205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
3401d. at 195.
34 11d.3 421d
"
343Id
34Prevish v. Northwest Medical Ctr., 692 A.2d 192, 195 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
341d. at 195-96.
3461d
"
34 71d. at 198.
3481d. at 196-97.
349Prevish v. Northwest Medical Ctr., 692 A.2d 192, 200-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
[Vol 1:911
CASE BRIEFS
The final issue was whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the
relation back doctrine to allow amendment of the title."0 The court noted
the writ of summons was the only document filed before the statute of
limitations had expired. Thus, the incorrect caption on the document did
not alert the opposing counsel that an executor of the estate even
existed.35 Since the statute of limitations aimed to preclude such
situations, the court held the relation back doctrine was inapplicable. 5
Prevish v. Northwest Medical Or., 692 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
Statute of Limitations Not Triggered Until Reasonable
Person Would Recognize Injury
The Colorado Court of Appeals held the statute of limitations for filing a
workers compensation claim was not triggered because of plaintifts mere
awareness of the pain from the back injury, and further held defendants
were responsible for plaintiffs out-of-state medical care.353
Plaintiff claimed his physical activities at work and his back injury
in 1991 were responsible for the herniation of his disc, which was
supported by his physician's report.314 Defendants argued plaintiff's disc
herniation was not related to his prior back injury.35s Defendants also
claimed the two-year statute of limitations had expired before plaintiff
filed suit.356 The court held the statute of limitations period began not
when the injury occurred, but when a reasonable person should have
become aware of the nature, seriousness, and compensable character of
his/her injury.357
Defendants also argued they should not be responsible for plaintiff's
out-of-state medical bills because plaintiff did not show a local or in-state
competent physician was available to treat him.311 The court disagreed,
3SId. at 196-97.
3Sld. at 204.
3S2Id. at 204-05.
35 3Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1997).
'-Id. at 497-498.
3551d.
3561d.
37Id. (citing City of Boulder v. Payne, 426 P.2d 194 (Colo. 1967)).31SDurango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496,499-500 (Colo. 1997).
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holding no provision required plaintiff to seek all possible health care
providers in plaintiffs area before an out-of-state provider would be
authorized to render treatment.359 In addition, the court emphasized no
evidence was presented showing the cost of the out-of-state physician's
services were more expensive than if the surgery had been performed in
plaintiff' s locale.360 Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1997).
TORTS
Physical Injury Not Required for Spouse
to Bring Loss of Consortium Suit
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision to dismiss a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising out of an employment termination.361 The appellate court reversed
the trial court's decision as to the issues regarding defamation, amendment
of the complaint, and loss of consortium.3 62
Plaintiff employee was terminated by defendant employer at the end
of ninety days of employment due to poor performance and failure to sign
his performance appraisal.36 3 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, because defendant's conduct was not extreme and
outrageous, nor intentional or reckless.364
Plaintiff also alleged defamation based upon his supervisor's
statement that an empty bullet casing was probably left by plaintiff.365
The trial court dismissed the complaint, because no substance or actual
language of defamation was included in the complaint.366 The appellate
court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the defamation
359Id.
360°d
"
36'Crowley v. North Am. Telecomms., 691 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1997).
3621d. at 1169.
3631d.
'64Id. at 1170.
3651d
"366Crowley v. North Am. Telecomms., 691 A.2d 1169, 1171 (D.C. 1997).
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claim, because plaintiff could possibly prove facts in support of his
allegation, thereby allowing him relief 3
67
Plaintiff further claimed defendant was not in compliance with the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) because plaintiffwas
not given information concerning the continuation of health insurance
coverage. 6s The appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion
in not allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint to include the fact
defendant had at least twenty employees.3 69 The court reasoned that
plaintiff had made no other requests to amend, the case had been pending
for only a brief period, plaintiff had not acted in bad faith, and allowing
leave to amend would not have prejudiced defendant in any way.370
Finally, the appellate court held physical injury to plaintiffs spouse
was not required to bring an action for loss of consortium. 71 The court
reasoned recovery should be permitted in cases in which plaintiff's spouse
proved actual loss of services or affection due to an actionable tort, despite
any physical injury suffered by the spouse.37 Crowley v. North Am.
Telecomms., 691 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1997).
TRADEIMARKS
Use of Word "Columbia" Not Trademark Infringement
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held plaintiffs claim of trademark infringement and false designation of
origin for use of word "Columbia" failed. 3
Plaintiff, the Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New
York, used the name "Columbia University" in reference to educational
services. Plaintiff owned the federal registration for that service mark.7
Defendant, ColumbiafHCA Healthcare Corporation, owned several
367Id. at 1172.36SId.
3Id.3701d. at 1173.37
'Crowley v. North Am. Telecomms., 691 A.2d 1169, 1174 (D.C. 1997).
372Id.
3
'Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F.Supp. 733,
750-751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).3741d. at 742-743.
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hospitals and medical facilities, and used the word "Columbia" as part of
its corporate name.375 Defendant's name seemed positive and national in
scope. 76 Plaintiff claimed trademark infiingement and false designation
of origin for defendant's use of the word Columbia.
3 77
The court found plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of an
exclusive use of the word Columbia in reference to medical services,
because such right encompasses only goods and services that were
specified in the registration certificate.3 78 However, the court concluded
the word Columbia was arbitrary and thus, the name was eligible for
protection without proof of a secondary meaning."' The court held
defendant' s use of the word Columbia was unlikely to mislead purchasers
or confuse purchasers as to the source of defendant' s services.38 The
court reasoned the name Columbia was distinguishable when used with
other words and phrases. Additionally, plaintiff had failed to prove the
likelihood of defendant entering plaintiff' s business.38' The court also
concluded plaintiff offered little evidence showing forward or reverse
confusion and plaintiff could not show defendant had acted in bad faith.382
Furthermore, the court ruled plaintiff was precluded from having
defendant adopt an alternative marketing position, because plaintiff had
knowledge for three and one-half years of defendant's use of the term
"Columbia. 383 Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp.,964 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
1751d. at 744.761d"
'
771d. at 741-742.
.T..rustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F.Supp. 733,
742-743 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
3791d.
3801d. at 745-746.381Id.
3821d. at 753.
..
3Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 764 F.Supp. 733,
751-752 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION
Injury at Work Causally Related to Suicide
The United States Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed a lower court's
ruling that the long-term effects of an injury sustained at work were
related to the decedent's suicide. 3'
The employee suffered a left shoulder injury on September 5, 1989,
when he tripped over a telephone cord at work.' 5 This injury was
compensable through worker's compensation and required several
316corrective surgeries. After the surgeries, the employee remained
incapacitated, resulting in his inability to work full-time or engage in
repetitive tasks.387 The employee began to suffer from low self-esteem
and depression since he could no longer support his family. 3 He
attempted suicide in December, 1990, and was subsequently
hospitalized.3s 9 Despite medication prescribed for his pain and depression,
the employee managed to take his own life via a drug overdose five years
later.390
The employee's estate and widow filed a claim for death benefits
pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Act.391  The Worker's
Compensation Commission (Commission) relied on plaintiffs' various
expert opinions and determined a causal relation existed between the
suicide and the work-related injury. As a result, the Commission
concluded compensation for the decedent's suicide was not barred, and the
employer appealed.39
2
The appellate court ruled a causal relationship existed between the
suicide and the injury.393 The attending physician's reports conclusively
demonstrated the decedent's stress was derived from chronic pain and
resultant depression.394 The appellate court held once the injury was
3"Food Distribs. v. Ball, 485 S.E.2d 155, 162 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
3uId. at 157.3ES1d.
387 Id.
3A SId
"
389Food Distribs. v. Ball, 485 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Va. CL App. 1997).
39Id.
391Id
"
"21d. at 157-5S.
393Id.
"'Food Distribs. v. Ball, 485 S.E.2d 155, 157-58 (Va. Ct App. 1997).
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compensable, the employer was liable for the full extent of the injury and
the decedent's suicide did not constitute an independent and willful act
barring compensation." Food Distribs. v. Ball, 485 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Va.
Ct. App. 1997).
Medical Expert Not Required to Establish Causation
Betveen Injury and Disability
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed a decision of the Workers
Compensation Commission (Commission).396  The court held the
Commission erred in reversing the Commissioner's finding that plaintiff
suffered an "injury by accident." '397 The court also held a causal
connection existed between plaintiff' s injury and the disability.39
During her employment at a hotel, plaintiff slipped and fell on the
bathroom floor in one of the rooms, resulting in an injury to her back.39
She reported the incident to her employer and the next day she went to the
emergency clinic for medical treatment.400 Because she spoke very little
English, plaintiff was unable to adequately explain the circumstances
surrounding her injury.40' Plaintiff subsequently sought medical attention
on several occasions.40 2
The Commissioner concluded plaintiff suffered an injury by accident
and awarded her compensation after hearing testimony describing the slip
and fall accident.40 3 On review, the appellate court concluded plaintiffs
injury was related to the slip and fall injury of 1992.404 The court found
the Commission did not have a reasonable basis to reverse the
Commissioner's determination.4 5 The court also concluded an expert
39Sld. at 158.
'
96Turcios v. Holiday Inn Fair Oaks, 483 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1997).
397Id. at 502.
398Id.
399Id.
4GOId.
4
°*Turcios v. Holiday Inn Fair Oaks, 483 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997).
4021d
"4
°3Id. at 505.404Id.4051d. at 506.
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medical opinion was not required to establish a relationship between the
injury and the disability.4 6 Therefore, the court reversed the decision of
the Commission and remanded the case.407 Turcios v. Holiday Inn Fair
Oaks, 483 S.E.2d 502. (Va. 1997).
WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
Failure to Warn Parents of Risk of Baby Born With
Sickle Cell Disease May Give Rise to Action
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed and remanded a trial
court decision, holding a physician had a duty to disclose all information
to a patient in order for the patient to make an informed decision.
Plaintiffs brought a claim of "wvrongful conception" after defendant
physician failed to inform them their baby had a 25 percent chance of
being born with sickle cell disease.4 9  The court held plaintiffs'
allegations were sufficient for a wrongful conception claim.
411
In 1991, plaintiffs visited defendant's office for the purpose of having
a blood test to determine whether they carried the sickle cell disease4
The blood tests revealed both plaintiffs carried the sickle cell disease,
which necessarily entailed a one in four chance of their child being born
vith the disease.412 However, defendant did not relay these statistics to
plaintiffs, and in 1994, they had a baby afflicted with the sickle cell
disease.413 Plaintiffs asserted defendant had a duty to inform them of the
blood test results in order to enable them to make an informed decision
about having children.414
After concluding plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful
conception, the court awarded damages for the extraordinary expenses
4 
'Turcios v. Holiday Inn Fair Oaks, 483 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1997).4
w Id.
40 McAllister v. Ha, 485 S.E.2d 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).41Id.
41id. at 85.
4 121d
"
413McAllister v. Ha, 485 S.E.2d S4, 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).4141d.
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incurred from the child's treatment for sickle cell disease.415 The court
found the extraordinary expenses "naturally and proximately" flowed
from the injury, which was the conception of a child afflicted with sickle
cell disease.416 Furthermore, the court held plaintiffs' allegations were
sufficient to warrant a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress.417  The court reasoned that defendant should have foreseen
plaintiffs would suffer emotional distress as a result of the physician's
failure-to reveal the results of the blood tests.418 Therefore, the court
concluded the trial court erred in dismissing the case, and remanded the
case for assessment of the claims of "wrongful conception" and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.419 McAllister v. Ha, 485 S.E.2d 84 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1997).
WRONGFUL DEATH
Court Cannot Second-Guess the Judgment of
a Military Physician Under the Feres Doctrine
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.420 Plaintiffs
brought a wrongful death action alleging the United States Navy caused
the death of their son and daughter-in-law through medical malpractice
and negligence.421
While stationed aboard a navy ship, plaintiffs' son was brought to a
treatment room. 422 X-rays revealed his right lung had collapsed due to
spontaneous pneumothorax. 43 He received thirteen units of blood from
the blood supply aboard the ship.424 Several years later, blood tests
4151d. at 87.
4 16Id.
4171d. at 87-88.41
'McAllister v. Ha, 485 S.E.2d 84, 88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).4 191d420L.J.B. v. United States, No. CIV-A96-3935, 1997 WL 162076, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 2,
1997). 4211d.4
"Id
4241d. at *2.
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revealed plaintiffs' son and daughter-in-law were HIV-positive, and
subsequently, both of them died of AIDS.4z Plaintiffs alleged their son
contracted the virus from the blood transfusion he received while aboard
the navy ship and later transmitted the virus to their daughter-in-law 6
The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Feres doctrine, that would bar plaintiffs' claim since
the injury "[arose] out of or in the course of activity incident to service.'"2
Because plaintiffs' son was on active duty when the blood transfusion was
given, the court found the medical treatment was incident to the medical
service, and therefore, the Feres doctrine barred plaintiffs' claims.42 3 The
court refused to second-guess the judgment of a military physician in
order to provide relief for the deaths of plaintiffs' son and daughter-in-
law. 429 L.J.B. v. United States, No. CIV. A.96-3935, 1997 WL 162076
(E.D. La. Apr. 2, 1997).
421L.j.B. v. United States, No. CIV-A96-3935, 1997 WL 162076, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 2,
1997).4261d
"427 d. (citing Kelly v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 26 F.3d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1995)).
42Id.
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